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Abstract— This paper studies interference channels with secu-
rity constraints. The existence of an external eavesdropper in a
two-user interference channel is assumed, where the network
users would like to secure their messages from the external
eavesdropper. The cooperative binning and channel prefixing
scheme is proposed for this system model which allows users to
cooperatively add randomness to the channel in order to degrade
the observations of the external eavesdropper. This scheme allows
users to add randomness to the channel in two ways: 1) Users
cooperate in their design of the binning codebooks, and 2)
Users cooperatively exploit the channel prefixing technique. As
an example, the channel prefixing technique is exploited in the
Gaussian case to transmit a superposition signal consisting of
binning codewords and independently generated noise samples.
Gains obtained form the cooperative binning and channel pre-
fixing scheme compared to the single user scenario reveals the
positive effect of interference in increasing the network security.
Remarkably, interference can be exploited to cooperatively add
randomness into the network in order to enhance the security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we consider two-user interference channels
with an external eavesdropper. Without the secrecy constraints,
the interference channel is studied extensively in the literature.
However, the capacity region is still not known except for
some special cases [1]–[4]. Interference channels with confi-
dential messages is recently studied by [5]–[7]. Nonetheless,
the external eavesdropper scenario has not been addressed
extensively in the literature yet. In fact, the only relevant work
regarding the security of the interference channels with an
external eavesdropper is the study of the secure degrees of
freedom (DoF) in the K-user Gaussian interference channels
under frequency selective fading models [7], where it is shown
that positive secure DoFs are achievable for each user in the
network.
In this work, we propose the cooperative binning and chan-
nel prefixing scheme for (discrete) memoryless interference
channels with an external eavesdropper. The proposed scheme
allows for cooperation in adding randomness to the channel
in two ways: 1) Cooperative binning: The random binning
technique of [8] is cooperatively exploited at both users. 2)
Channel prefixing: Users exploit the channel prefixing tech-
nique of [9] in a cooperative manner. The proposed scheme
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also utilizes the message-splitting technique of [10] and partial
decoding of the interfering signals is made possible at the
receivers. The achievable secrecy rate region with the proposed
scheme is given. For the Gaussian interference channel, the
channel prefixing technique is exploited to inject artificially
generated noise samples into the network, where we also allow
power control at transmitters to enhance the security of the
network.
The proposed scheme is closely related with that of [11]–
[13]. [11] considered the relay-eavesdropper channel and
proposed the noise-forwarding scheme where the relay node
sends a codeword from an independently generated code-
book to add randomness to the network in order to en-
hance the security of the main channel. [12] considered
Gaussian multiple-access wire-tap channels and proposed the
cooperative jamming scheme in which users transmit their
codewords or add randomness to the channel by transmitting
noise samples, but not both. The approach in this sequel,
when specialized to the Gaussian multiple access channel
with an external eavesdropper, generalizes and extends the
proposed achievable regions given in [12], due to the imple-
mentation of simultaneous cooperative binning and jamming
at the transmitters together with more general time-sharing
approaches. This simultaneous transmission of secret messages
and noise samples from transmitters is considered by [13].
In [13], authors proposed artificially generated noise injec-
tion schemes for multi-transmit antenna wire-tap channels, in
which the superposition of a secrecy signal and an artificially
generated noise is transmitted from the transmitter, where the
noisy transmission only degrades the eavesdropper’s channel.
For the single transmit antenna case, wire-tap channels with
helper nodes is considered, in which helper nodes trans-
mit artificially generated noise samples in order to degrade
the eavesdropper’s channel. Remarkable, exploitation of the
channel prefixing technique was transparent in these previous
studies. The proposed scheme in this work shows that the
benefit of cooperative jamming scheme of [12] and noise
injection scheme of [13] originates from the channel prefixing
technique. In addition, compared to [6], the proposed scheme
allows for cooperation via both binning and channel prefixing
techniques, whereas in [6] one of the transmitters is allowed to
generate and transmit noise together with the secret signal and
cooperation among network users as considered in this sequel
was not implemented for the confidential message scenario.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. In Section III, the main result
for discrete memoryless interference channels is given. Section
IV is devoted to some examples of the proposed scheme
for Gaussian channels. Finally, we provide some concluding
remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-user interference channel with an ex-
ternal eavesdropper (IC-EE), comprised of two transmitter-
receiver pairs and an additional eavesdropping node. The
discrete memoryless IC-EE is denoted by
(X1 ×X2, p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2),Y1 × Y2 × Ye),
for some finite sets X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Ye. Here the symbols
(x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 are the channel inputs and the symbols
(y1, y2, ye) ∈ Y1×Y2×Ye are the channel outputs observed at
the decoder 1, decoder 2, and at the eavesdropper, respectively.
The channel is memoryless and time-invariant: 1
p(y1(i), y2(i), ye(i)|xi1,xi2,yi−11 ,yi−12 ,yi−1e )
= p(y1(i), y2(i), ye(i)|x1(i), x2(i)).
We assume that each transmitter k ∈ {1, 2} has a secret
message Wk which is to be transmitted to the respective
receivers in n channel uses and to be secured from the external
eavesdropper. In this setting, an (n,M1,M2, Pe,1, Pe,2) secret
codebook has the following components:
1) The secret message sets Wk = {1, ...,Mk} for transmit-
ter k = 1, 2.
2) Encoding function fk(.) at transmitter k which map the
secret messages to the transmitted symbols, i.e., fk : wk →
Xk for each wk ∈ Wk for k = 1, 2.
3) Decoding function φk(.) at receiver k which map the
received symbols to estimate of the message: φk(Yk) = wˆk
for k = 1, 2.
Reliability of the transmission of user k is measured by
Pe,k, where
Pe,k ,
1
M1M2
∑
(w1,w2)∈W1×W2
Pr {φk(Yk) 6= wk|Ew1,w2} ,
where Ew1,w2 is the event that (w1, w2) is transmitted from
the transmitters.
For the secrecy requirement, the level of ignorance of the
eavesdropper with respect to the secured messages is measured
by the equivocation rate
1
n
H (W1,W2|Ye) .
1In this work, we have the following notation: Vectors are denoted as
x
i = {x(1), · · · , x(i)}, where we omit the i if i = n, i.e., x =
{x(1), · · · , x(n)}. Random variables are denoted with capital letters (X),
and random vectors are denoted as bold-capital letters (Xi). Again, we drop
the i for X = {X(1), · · · ,X(n)}. Lastly, [x]+ , max{0, x}, α¯ , 1− α,
and γ(x) , 1
2
log2(1 + x).
We say that the rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable for the IC-EE
if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exists an (n,M1 = 2nR1 ,M2 =
2nR2 , Pe,1, Pe,2) secret codebook such that,
max{Pe,1, Pe,2} ≤ ǫ,
and
R1 +R2 − 1
n
H (W1,W2|Ye) ≤ ǫ (1)
for sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity region is the
closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2) and is
denoted as CIC-EE.
A. The Gaussian Interference Channel with an External
Eavesdropper in Standard Form
The Gaussian interference channel in standard form is given
in [14]. We have the same transformation here for the Gaussian
interference channel with an external eavesdropper (GIC-EE)
model. We remark that the channel capacity will remain the
same as the transformations are invertible. We represent the
average power constraints of the transmitters as Pk, where
codewords should satisfy 1
n
n∑
t=1
(Xk(t))
2 ≤ Pk for k = 1, 2.
Here the input-output relationship, i.e., p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2),
changes to the following:
Y1 = X1 +
√
c21X2 +N1
Y2 =
√
c12X1 +X2 +N2 (2)
Ye =
√
c1eX1 +
√
c2eX2 +Ne,
where Nk ∼ N (0, 1) for k = 1, 2, e as depicted in Fig. 1. The
secrecy capacity region of the GIC-EE is denoted as CGIC-EE.
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Fig. 1. The Gaussian interference channel with an external eavesdropper in
standard form. Nk ∼ N (0, 1) for k = 1, 2, e.
III. THE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS INTERFERENCE
CHANNEL WITH AN EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we introduce the proposed cooperative
binning and channel prefixing scheme for the IC-EE model.
With this scheme, transmitters design their secrecy codebooks
using the random binning technique [8]. This binning structure
in the codebook let a transmitter to add randomness in its
own signals. However, the price of adding extra randomness to
secure the transmission appear as a rate loss in the achievable
rate expressions. In our scenario, the proposed strategy allows
for cooperation in design of these binning codebooks, and
allows for cooperation in prefixing the channel as we utilize
the channel prefixing technique of [9] at both users. Hence,
users of the interference channel will add only sufficient
amount of randomness as the other user will help to increase
the randomness seen by the eavesdropper. The achievable
secure rate region with this scheme is described below.
First consider auxiliary random variables Q, C1, S1, O1,
C2, S2, and O2 defined on arbitrary finite sets Q, C1, S1,
O1, C2, S2, and O2, respectively. Now, let P be the set
of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, C1,
S1, O1, C2, S2, O2, X1, X2, Y1, Y2, and Ye that factors
as p(q, c1, s1, o1, c2, s2, o2, x1, x2, y1, y2, ye) = p(q) p(c1|q)
p(s1|q) p(o1|q) p(c2|q) p(s2|q) p(o2|q) p(x1|c1, s1, o1, q)
p(x2|c2, s2, o2, q) p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2). Here, the variable Q
serves as a time-sharing parameter. See, for example, [10], [15]
for a discussion on time-sharing parameters. The variable C1
is used to construct the common secured signal of transmitter 1
that has to be decoded at both receivers, where the random bin-
ning technique of [8] is used for this construction. The variable
S1 is used to construct the self secured signal that has to be
decoded at receiver 1 but not at receiver 2, where the random
binning technique of [8] is used for this construction. The
variable O1 is used to construct other signal of transmitter 1
that has to be decoded at receiver 2 but not at receiver 1, where
the conventional random codebook construction, see for exam-
ple [15], is used for this signal, i.e., no binning is implemented.
Similarly, C2, S2, and O2 are utilized at user 2. Finally, it is
important to remark that the channel prefixing technique of [9]
is exploited with this construction as we transformed the chan-
nel p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2) to p(y1, y2, ye|c1, s1, o1, c2, s2, o2, q)
using the prefixes p(x1|c1, s1, o1, q) and p(x2|c2, s2, o2, q).
To ease the presentation, we first state the following defi-
nitions. We define T1 , C1, T2 , S1, T3 , O1, T4 , C2,
T5 , S2, T6 , O2 and corresponding rates RTi and RxTi .
Note that we choose RO1 = RO2 = 0 below. Also, we define
TS , {Ti|i ∈ S}.
Definition 1: R1(p) is the set of all tuples
(RC1 , R
x
C1
, RS1 , R
x
S1
, RC2 , R
x
C2
, RxO2) satisfying∑
i∈S
RTi +R
x
Ti
≤ I(TS ;Y1|TSc , Q), ∀S ⊆ {1, 2, 4, 6}, (3)
for a given joint distribution p.
Definition 2: R2(p) is the set of all tuples
(RC2 , R
x
C2
, RS2 , R
x
S2
, RC1 , R
x
C1
, RxO1) satisfying∑
i∈S
RTi +R
x
Ti
≤ I(TS ;Y2|TSc , Q), ∀S ⊆ {1, 3, 4, 5}, (4)
for a given joint distribution p.
Definition 3: Re(p) is the set of all tuples
(RxC1 , R
x
S1
, RxO1 , R
x
C2
, RxS2 , R
x
O2
) satisfying∑
i∈S
RxTi ≤ I(TS ;Ye|TSc , Q), ∀S $ {1, · · · , 6},∑
i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6}
RxTi = I(T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6;Ye|Q), (5)
for a given joint distribution p.
Definition 4: R(p) is the closure of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 = RC1 +RS1 ,
R2 = RC2 +RS2 ,
(RC1 , R
x
C1
, RS1 , R
x
S1
, RC2 , R
x
C2
, RxO2) ∈ R1(p),
(RC2 , R
x
C2
, RS2 , R
x
S2
, RC1 , R
x
C1
, RxO1) ∈ R2(p),
(RxC1 , R
x
S1
, RxO1 , R
x
C2
, RxS2 , R
x
O2
) ∈ Re(p),
and
RC1 ≥ 0, RxC1 ≥ 0, RS1 ≥ 0, RxS1 ≥ 0, RxO1 ≥ 0,
RC2 ≥ 0, RxC2 ≥ 0, RS2 ≥ 0, RxS2 ≥ 0, RxO2 ≥ 0, (6)
for a given joint distribution p.
We now state the main result of the paper. The achievable
secrecy rate region using the cooperative binning and channel
prefixing scheme is as follows.
Theorem 5: RIC-EE , the closure of
{ ⋃
p∈P
R(p)
}
⊂
CIC-EE.
Proof: The proof is omitted and will be provided in the
journal version of this work.
IV. THE GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL WITH AN
EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we provide some examples of the proposed
coding scheme for Gaussian interference channels and show
that the proposed scheme provides gains in securing the net-
work by exploiting cooperative binning, cooperative channel
prefixing, and time-sharing techniques.
Firstly, we describe how the channel prefixing can be imple-
mented in this Gaussian scenario. Here, one can independently
generate and transmit noise samples for each channel use from
the transmitters (without constructing a codebook and sending
one of its messages) to enhance the security of the network. As
there is no design of a codebook at the interfering user for this
noise transmission, receivers and the eavesdropper can only
consider this transmission as noise. Accordingly, transmitter
k ∈ {1, 2} uses power P bk for the construction of its (binning)
codewords, which are explained in the previous section, and
obtains, somehow, the signal Xbk ∼ N (0, P bk ). In addition, it
uses power P jk for its jamming signal and generates i.i.d. noise
samples represented by Xjk ∼ N (0, P jk ), where we choose
P bk+P
j
k ≤ Pk. Then, it sends Xbk+Xjk to the channel, instead
of just sending Xbk.
Now, we can use the scheme proposed in the previous
section for the design of the signals Xbk. Below we
will use superposition coding to construct this signal.
But first, for a rigorous presentation, we provide
some definitions. Let A denote the set of all tuples(
P c1 (q), P
s
1 (q), P
o
1 (q), P
c
2 (q), P
s
2 (q), P
o
2 (q), P
j
1 (q), P
j
2 (q)
)
satisfying P bk (q) , P ck (q) + P sk (q) + P ok (q) and∑
q∈Q
(P bk (q) + P
j
k (q))p(q) ≤ Pk, for k = 1, 2.
Now, we define a set of joint distributions P1 as follows.
P1 ,
{
p | p ∈ P ,
(P c1 (q), P
s
1 (q), P
o
1 (q), P
c
2 (q), P
s
2 (q), P
o
2 (q), P
j
1 (q), P
j
2 (q)) ∈
A, C1 ∼ N (0, P c1 (q)), S1 ∼ N (0, P s1 (q)), O1 ∼
N (0, P o1 (q)), C2 ∼ N (0, P c2 (q)), S2 ∼ N (0, P s2 (q)),
O2 ∼ N (0, P o2 (q)), Xj1 ∼ N (0, P j1 (q)), Xj2 ∼ N (0, P j2 (q)),
X1 = C1+S1+O1+X
j
1 , X2 = C2+S2+O2+X
j
2
}
, where
the Gaussian model given in (2) gives p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2).
Then, the following region is achievable for the Gaussian
interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
Corollary 6: RGIC-EE , the closure of
{ ⋃
p∈P1
R(p)
}
⊂
CGIC-EE.
We emphasize the way of implementing the channel prefix-
ing technique of [9, Lemma 4]: p(xk|ck, sk, ok, q) is chosen
by Xk = Ck + Sk + Ok + Xjk . With this choice, we are
able to implement simultaneous binning and jamming at the
transmitters together with a power control.
A. Subregions of RGIC-EE
We now present a computationally simpler region. Consider
P2 , {p | p ∈ P1, Q = ∅}.
Corollary 7: RGIC-EE2 , convex closure of
{ ⋃
p∈P2
R(p)
}
⊂ RGIC-EE ⊂ CGIC-EE.
We also provide a sub-region of RGIC-EE2 that will be used
for numerical results. Define a set of joint distributions P3.
P3 , {p | p ∈ P2, P s1 = P o1 = P s2 = P o2 = 0}.
Corollary 8: RGIC-EE3 , convex closure of
{ ⋃
p∈P3
R(p)
}
⊂ RGIC-EE ⊂ CGIC-EE.
It is important to note that we use the convex closure of
the rate regions instead of using a time-sharing parameter in
these subregions. We have already given the more general
region above and we conjecture that it is possible to extend
these achievable subregions by a different choice of channel
prefixing or by using a time-sharing approach.
Accordingly, we consider a TDMA-like approach, which
will show that even a simple type of time-sharing is beneficial.
Here we divide the n channel uses into two intervals of lengths
represented by αn and (1 − α)n, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and αn
is assumed to be an integer. The first period, of length αn, is
dedicated to secure transmission for user 1. During this time,
transmitter 1 generates binning codewords using power P b1 and
jams the channel using power P j11 ; and transmitter 2 jams the
channel using power P j12 . For the second period the roles of
the users are reversed, where users use powers P b2 , P
j2
2 , and
P
j2
1 . We call this scheme cooperative TDMA (C-TDMA) and
obtain the following region in this case.
Corollary 9: RC−TDMA ⊂ RGIC-EE ⊂ CGIC-EE, where
RC−TDMA , closure of the convex hull of

⋃
0≤α≤1
α(P b1+P
j1
1 )+α¯P
j2
1
≤P1
αP
j1
2
+α¯(P b2+P
j2
2 )≤P2
(R1, R2)


, (7)
where
R1 = α
[
γ
(
Pb
1
1+P
j1
1
+c21P
j1
2
)
− γ
(
c1eP
b
1
1+c1eP
j1
1
+c2eP
j1
2
)]+
,
and
R2 = α¯
[
γ
(
Pb
2
1+P
j2
2
+c12P
j2
1
)
− γ
(
c2eP
b
2
1+c2eP
j2
2
+c1eP
j2
1
)]+
.
Note that, we only consider adding randomness by noise
injection for the cooperative TDMA scheme above. However,
our coding scheme presented in the previous section allows
for an implementation of more general cooperation strategies,
in which users can add randomness to the channel in two
ways: adding randomness via cooperative binning and adding
randomnees via cooperative channel prefixing. A user by
implementing both of these approaches can help the other one
in a time-division setting. We again remark that the proposed
cooperative binning and channel prefixing scheme allows even
more general approaches such as having more than two time-
sharing periods.
B. Numerical Results and Discussion
In this section we provide numerical results for the follow-
ing subregions of the achievable region given by Corollary 6.
1) RGIC-EE3 : This region is provided above, where we utilize
both cooperative binning and channel prefixing.
2) RGIC-EE3 (b or cp): Here we utilize either cooperative
binning or channel prefixing scheme at a transmitter, but not
both.
3) RGIC-EE3 (ncp): Here we only utilize cooperative binning.
Accordingly, jamming powers are set to zero.
4) RC−TDMA: This region is an example of utilizing both
time-sharing and cooperative channel prefixing. No coopera-
tive binning is used.
5) RC−TDMA(nscp): Here we do not allow transmitters to
jam the channel during their dedicated time slots and call this
case no self channel prefixing (nscp).
6) RC−TDMA(ncp): Here no channel prefixing is imple-
mented. This case refers to conventional TDMA scheme, in
which users are allowed to transmit during only their assigned
slots. Hence, this scheme only utilizes time-sharing.
Numerical results are provided in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. The first
scenario depicted in Fig. 2 shows the benefits of cooperative
binning technique. Also, cooperative channel prefixing does
not help to enlarge the secure rate region in this scenario.
Secondly, in Fig. 3, we consider an asymmetric scenario, in
which the first user has a weak channel to the eavesdropper
but the second user has a strong channel to the eavesdropper.
Here, the second user can help the first one to increase its
secrecy rate. However, channel prefixing and time-sharing
does not help to the second user as it can not achieve
positive secure rate without an implementation of cooperative
binning. Remarkable, cooperative binning technique helps the
second user to achieve positive secure transmission rate in
this case. These observations suggest the implementation of
all three techniques (cooperative binning, cooperative channel
prefixing, and time-sharing) as considered in our general rate
region, i.e., RGIC-EE.
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Fig. 2. Numerical results for GIC-EE with c12 = c21 = 1.9, c1e = c2e =
0.5, P1 = P2 = 10.
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Fig. 3. Numerical results for GIC-EE with c12 = 1.9, c21 = 1, c1e = 0.5,
c2e = 1.6, P1 = P2 = 10.
C. Some Implications of the Proposed Scheme
It can be shown that the proposed scheme reduces to the
noise forwarding scheme of [11] for the discrete memoryless
relay-eavesdropper channel. Remarkable, the channel prefixing
technique can be exploited in this scenario to increase the
achievable secure rates. For example, for the Gaussian channel,
injecting i.i.d. noise samples can increase the achievable
secure transmission rates as shown in [16]. Our result here
shows that the gain resulting from the noise injection comes
from the exploitation of the channel prefixing technique. In
addition, the proposed scheme, when specialized to a Gaussian
multiple-access scenario, results in an achievable region that
generalizes and extends the proposed regions given in [12]
due to the implementation of simultaneous cooperative binning
and channel prefixing at the transmitters together with more
general time-sharing approaches.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered two-user interference
channels with an external eavesdropper. We have proposed
the cooperative binning and channel prefixing scheme that
utilizes random binning, channel prefixing, and time-sharing
techniques and allows transmitters to cooperate in adding ran-
domness to the channel. For Gaussian interference channels,
the channel prefixing technique is exploited by letting users to
inject independently generated noise samples to the channel.
The most interesting aspect of our results is, perhaps, the
unveiling of the role of interference in cooperatively adding
randomness to the channel to increase the secrecy rates of
multi-user networks.
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